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Abstract 
This paper analyzes independence concepts 
for sets of probability measures associated 
with directed acyclic graphs. The paper 
shows that epistemic independence and the 
standard Markov condition violate desirable 
separation properties. The adoption of a 
contraction condition leads to d-separation 
but still fails to guarantee a belief separa­
tion property. To overcome this unsatisfac­
tory situation, a strong Markov condition is 
proposed, based on epistemic independence. 
The main result is that the strong Markov 
condition leads to strong independence and 
does enforce separation properties; this re­
sult implies that (1) separation properties of 
Bayesian networks do extend to epistemic in­
dependence and sets of probability measures, 
and (2) strong independence has a clear justi­
fication based on epistemic independence and 
the strong Markov condition. 
1 Introduction 
Sets of probability measures, called credal sets by 
Levi [17], are quite flexible representations for uncer­
tainty, employed in several theories [3, 12, 14, 15, 17, 
18, 20, 21, 23]. Credal sets can be used to represent 
the opinions of a group of experts, to model the impre­
cision and incompleteness of realistic decision making, 
and to investigate the effect of perturbations in stan­
dard probabilistic models. 
This paper focuses on credal sets that are represented 
by directed acyclic graphs. Such structures are called 
credal networks1 and have been investigated by sev­
eral authors [1, 4, 11, 22]. The idea is to associate 
The author was partially supported by a grant from 
CNPq, Brazil. 
1The author has employed the term Quasi-Bayesian 
a local credal set with each node in a directed acyclic 
graph, mimicking the theory of Bayesian networks [19]. 
Figure 1 shows a simple credal network; note that all 
nodes are associated with probability intervals. Sec­
tions 2 and 3 briefly review the main ideas connected 
with credal sets and credal networks. 
There are two difficulties with credal networks. First, 
there are several concepts of independence for credal 
sets. Second, there are several ways to combine locally 
defined credal sets in a credal network, i.e., several 
extensions can be defined for a given network. Conse­
quently, it is hard to tell exactly what a credal network 
represents. Take the network in Figure 1: Is it repre­
senting a credal set where W and Y are epistemically 
independent given X ,  or a credal set where W and Y 
are strongly independent given X? Is it representing 
the largest credal set for a given concept of indepen­
dence, or a credal set constructed in some special way? 
The objective of this paper is to present a theory 
of credal networks that overcomes the difficulties de­
scribed in the previous paragraph. The idea is to ana­
lyze concepts of independence and methods of exten­
sion through their separation properties. Sections 4 
and 5 present current approaches to credal networks 
and analyze their weaknesses. Based on this analysis, 
a new condition, called the strong Markov condition, 
is presented (Section 6). The strong Markov condition 
can alone organize the theory of credal sets: it implies 
that a small number of intuitive elements leads to a 
unique, computationally tractable type of extension 
for credal networks, with pleasant separation proper­
ties. 
The argument leading to the strong Markov condition 
can be summarized as follows. There are two impor­
tant concepts of independence for credal sets: strong 
and epistemic independence (Section 2). Strong in­
dependence leads to strong extensions, which inherit 
networks [7, 8]; the term credal networks, proposed by Zaf­
falon [24], seems more appropriate. 
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0. 2 � p(w) � 0. 3 
0. 1 � p(xlw) � 0. 2 
0. 4 � p(ylx) � 0.5 
0. 7 � p(zly) � 0. 8 
0. 8 � p(xlwc) � 0.9 
0.5 � p(ylxc) � 0. 6 
0. 1 � p(zlyc) � 0. 2 
Figure 1: Credal network with four binary variables 
(superscript c indicates negation). 
several nice features of Bayesian networks, including 
computational simplicity (Section 4). But strong in­
dependence is mostly a mathematical generalization 
of standard stochastic independence without a clear, 
direct justification. Section 5 moves the focus from 
strong independence to epistemic independence. Sec­
tion 5 investigates the separation properties of exten­
sions based on epistemic independence and the stan­
dard Markov condition. The rationale for this inves­
tigation is that the separation properties of standard 
stochastic independence are fundamental in the theory 
of Bayesian networks. In fact, separation properties 
are not just implied by stochastic independence, sep­
aration properties validate the concept of stochastic 
independence. Section 5 presents a number of novel 
examples to demonstrate that epistemic independence 
and the standard Markov condition violate desirable 
separation properties; the examples also indicate that 
epistemic independence leads to extensions that are 
intractable in practice. Given the weaknesses of the 
extensions analyzed in Sections 4 and 5 ,  we are led 
to ask whether there is some intuitive condition on 
a credal network that (1) is based on epistemic inde­
pendence, and (2) produces a suitable, tractable type 
of extension. The strong Markov condition is such a 
condition, as argued in Section 7. 
2 Credal sets 
This section contains basic definitions and notation 
used in the paper. For discrete random variables X 
and Y, p(X) denotes the probability density of X , 
p(XIy) denotes the conditional density of X given the 
event {Y = y } , Ep[f(X)) denotes the expectation of 
function f(X) with respect to p(X), and Ep[f(X)Iy) 
denotes the expectation of function f(X) with respect 
to p(XIy) . 
A credal set K is a collection of probability mea­
sures. A credal set defined by a collection of den­
sities p(X) is denoted by K(X). Given a credal 
set K(X) and a function f(X), the lower and up­
per expectations of f(X) are defined respectively as 
E[f(X)) = minl(X)EK(X) Ep[f(X)) and E[f(X)) = 
maxl(X)EK(X) Ep[f(X)]. A credal set defines a unique 
lower expectation for every bounded function. Sim­
ilarly, the lower probability and the upper probabil­
ity of event A are defined respectively as P(A) = 
minl(X)EK(X) P(A) and P(A) = maxl(X)EK(X) P(A). 
A set of probability measures and its convex hull pro­
duce the same lower and upper expectations. The no­
tation 0K indicates the convex hull of a set of mea­
sures K and the notation extK indicates the extreme 
points of a credal set K.  
Inference is performed by applying Bayes rule to each 
measure in a credal set; the posterior credal set is the 
union of all posterior probability measures [14). A con­
ditional credal set K(XIy) contains densities p(XIy) 
for random variables X and Y. 
There are several concepts of independence that can 
be applied to credal sets [6, 10). To understand them, 
consider the two definitions of stochastic independence 
in probability theory. Variables X and Y are stochas­
tically independent either if p(XIy) = p(X) for any 
value y , or if p(X, Y) = p(X) p(Y) (appropriate pos­
itivity conditions may be required). Several authors 
have tried to adapt both methods to the theory of 
credal sets using various multiplication operators and 
conditioning rules. The next subsections describe con­
cepts that can be cast in the language of credal sets. 
2.1 Epistemic independence 
The idea of epistemic independence [23, Chap. 9) is 
to start from an asymmetric irrelevance relation and 
then define independence from irrelevance. 
Definition 1 Variable Y is epistemically irrelevant to 
X given Z, denoted by (Y EIR X I Z), if K(XIz) and 
K(XIy, z) have the same convex hull for all possible 
values of Y and Z. 
In terms of lower expectations, (Y EIR X I Z) iff 
E[f(X)Iy, z ]  = E[f(X)Iz) for any function f(X) and 
all possible values of Y and Z. Epistemic irrelevance 
gets an intuitive significance when we think that lower 
and upper expectations are the practical consequences 
of beliefs, as they are used for decision-making and in­
ference. Irrelevance of Y to X means that the practical 
consequences of our beliefs about X are not affected 
by knowledge of Y. If we take two credal sets to be 
equivalent when their convex hulls agree, we have that 
(Y EIR X I Z) iff K(XIz) and K(XIy, z) are equivalent 
for all possible values of Y and Z. A more stringent 
definition would be to impose equality between K(XIz) 
and K(XIy, z) for all possible values of Y and Z. If 
K(XIz) and K(XIy, z) are non-convex, then equality 
UNCERTAINTY IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PROCEEDINGS 2000 109 
and equivalence have different meanings. 
Epistemic independence is just a symmetrization of 
epistemic irrelevance. 
Definition 2 Variables X and Y are epistemically 
independent given Z, denoted by (X EIN Y I Z), if 
(X EIR Y I Z) and (Y EIR X I Z). 
2.2 Strong independence 
Consider the following concept: 
Definition 3 Variables X and Y are strongly inde­
pendent when every extreme point of K(X, Y) satisfies 
standard stochastic independence of X and Y. 
This concept is called independence in the selection 
by Couso et al [6]; they employ strong independence 
when the joint credal set is the largest credal set that 
satisfies Definition 3. Here we prefer to use strong 
independence and take the largest credal set as the 
strong extension (Section 4) . 
We can even ask that every probability density in a 
credal set factorizes according to stochastic indepen­
dence. In this case the resulting credal set is non­
convex [16]. Note that from a behavioral point of view, 
insisting on stochastic independence for all probabili­
ties in a credal set is excessive because it suggests that 
a credal set and its convex hull are different. But two 
individuals with the exact same lower and upper ex­
pectations should have equivalent beliefs, at least from 
a behavioral perspective. On the other hand, adopting 
convexity significantly diminishes the justification for 
stochastic independence. Even if all extreme points of 
a convex credal set display independence between two 
variables, there may be densities in the credal set that 
display dependence between the variables [2, 5]. To 
accommodate these conflicting views, the definition of 
strong independence does not require (nor prohibits) 
convexity. 
Strong independence is reasonable in a "sensitivity 
analysis" interpretation of credal sets: a credal set is 
then viewed as a set containing a "true" probability, 
and not as a representation of uncertainty in itself [23). 
Strong independence is also reasonable when a collec­
tion of experts, specifying a credal set, agrees that ev­
ery lower expectation must be computed with respect 
to a density that displays stochastic independence. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of strong independence, 
there is no known direct justification for it - a justi­
fication that does not employ stochastic independence 
as a starting point. Definitions of strong independence 
usually assume stochastic independence and standard 
probability - a most undesirable situation, as the 
theory of credal sets purports to offer a more basic 
approach to uncertainty, an approach that contains 
standard probability theory as a limiting case. Strong 
independence stands as a mathematically-minded gen­
eralization of the factorization property of standard 
stochastic independence. 
One concept of independence that might character­
ize strong independence through lower expectations 
is Kuznetsov's independence. Variables X and Y are 
(Kuznetsov-)independent given Z if, for any functions 
f(X) and g(Y) and all values of Z, 
E[J(X)g(Y)Iz ]  = E[f(X)Iz ] x E[g(Y)Iz], (1) 
where E[f(X) ]  indicates [E[f(X) ], E[f(X)]] and x in­
dicates interval multiplication. It is an open question 
whether this concept is equivalent to some form of 
strong independence; even if it were, Expression (1) 
cannot be easily justified except as a mathematical 
generalization of standard stochastic independence. 2 
3 Graphical models 
Multivariate statistical models can be elegantly repre­
sented by graphical models, as demonstrated by the 
theory of Bayesian networks (19) . A Bayesian net­
work is composed of a directed acyclic graph and a 
collection of variables X. Each node in the graph is 
associated with a variable Xi and with a conditional 
density p(Xilpa(Xi)). Bayesian networks satisfy the 
Markov condition: Every variable is independent of 
its nondescendants non-parents given its parents. The 
Markov condition implies that every Bayesian network 
represents a unique joint probability 
(2) 
Credal networks are structures that represent joint 
credal sets through directed acyclic graphs; for this 
purpose, define [8]: 
Definition 4 A locally defined credal network for a 
collection of variables X is a directed acyclic graph 
where every node is associated with a variable Xi and 
with a local credal set K(Xilpa(Xi)). 
A joint credal set K(X) that satisfies all constraints 
in a credal network is an extension of the network. 
Note that Definition 4 does not generate a unique ex­
tension for a given credal network [8]. The flexibility 
of Definition 4 seems justified as a starting point, as 
2Unfortunately, Kuznetsov died in an accident at the 
beginning of 1998, and little is known about his concept of 
independence. 
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it would be unduly restrictive to select an extension, 
among the many possible extensions, as the "correct" 
one. The next sections look at strategies that automat­
ically specify the independence judgements in credal 
networks; the analysis will lead to the strong Markov 
condition (Section 6) . 
4 Strong extensions 
What happens if every variable in a credal network 
is strongly independent of its nondescendants non­
parents given its parents? We can ask for the largest 
possible credal set that satisfies this type of Markov 
condition; call this credal set the strong extension of 
the network. 
Strong extensions have a rather simple form. As 
proved in Appendix A: 
Theorem 1 The strong extension of a locally de­
fined credal network with convex local credal sets is 
the convex hull of all probability densities that sat­
isfy the Markov condition on the network when each 
conditional probability p(Xilpa(Xi)), for each value of 
pa(Xi), is selected from K(Xilpa(Xi)): 
(3) 
This result is apparently assumed, or at least known 
informally, in most of the literature that associates 
credal sets with directed acyclic graphs [4, 7, 11, 22]. 
The convexity of the local credal sets K(Xilpa(Xi)) 
is quite a reasonable assumption that is usually taken 
for granted. Most of the literature starts from Expres­
sion (3) and argues that this expression is the "correct" 
extension of a credal network, rather than obtaining it 
as a consequence of strong independence. 3 
Strong extensions have an intuitive similarity with 
standard Bayesian networks, and they satisfy one of 
the most important properties of Bayesian networks 
(as proved in Appendix A): 
Theorem 2 Given a credal network where all com­
binations of variables have positive probability, every 
d-separation relation in the network corresponds to a 
strong independence in the strong extension of the net­
work. 
Actually, d-separation relations even imply epistemic 
independence in strong extensions [8], so the similarity 
to Bayesian networks is quite remarkable. 
3The author has employed the term "type-1 extension" 
to refer to Expression (3) [7, 8]. 
On the negative side, strong extensions are just as hard 
to justify as strong independence. They make sense in 
a "sensitivity analysis" interpretation of credal sets, 
but they can only have as compelling a justification as 
strong independence. 
5 Extensions based on epistemic 
independence 
Suppose we adopt epistemic independence as a solid 
and compelling concept of independence, and we adopt 
the standard Markov condition: Every variable in a 
credal network is epistemically independent of its non­
descendants non-parents given its parents. What sep­
aration properties are valid in this model? The follow­
ing example shows that d-separation does not imply 
epistemic independence. 
Example 1 A group of experts models a domain 
by the credal network in Figure 1. The experts 
reach a preliminary model by adopting all extreme 
points of the strong extension that satisfy either 
(p(zly) ,p(zlyc)) = (0. 7, 0. 2) or (p(zly) , p(zlyc)) = 
(0. 8, 0. 1) .  Denote the resulting extension by 
K'(Z, Y, X, W) (this extension has 64 extreme points). 
Table 1 shows two extreme points of K'(Z, Y, X, W) 
(denoted by p�, p�). After additional discussion, the 
experts conclude that an additional probability mea­
sure p* must be added to the extension (also shown 
in Table 1) . The experts agree on the extension 
K"(Z, Y, X, W) = {p* UK'(Z, Y, X, W)}, because this 
credal set satisfies (tightly) all probability bounds and 
also satisfies the Markov condition for epistemic inde­
pendence: (W EIN Y I X) and ((W, X) EIN Z I Y). 
Unfortunately, d-separation does not imply epistemic 
independence in the extension K"(Z, Y, X, W). Note 
that Z and W are d-separated by X, but it is not 
true that (W EIN Z I X). For example, p(zlx) 
8501/22707 < 19/50 = E(zlx , w) . 
-
o 
Of course, if d-separation were to be maintained at 
all costs, we could simply impose it. We would say 
that, in any extension of a credal network, d-separation 
must imply epistemic independence. If d-separation 
seems too convoluted to be adopted outright, we can 
optionally adopt the following condition: 
Definition 5 (Contraction condition) Suppose 
W, X, Y, and Z are collections of variables in a 
credal network and X, Y and Z are non-descendants 
of W. If Y is epistemically irrelevant to X given Z, 
and Y is epistemicallly irrelevant to W given (X, Z) , 
then Y is epistemically irrelevant to (W, X) given Z. 
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zyxw zyxwc zyxcw zyxcwc zycxw zycxwc zycxcw zycxcwc 
p� 7/1250 112/625 63/1000 7/125 3/1250 48/625 9/500 2/125 
p� 4/625 128/625 54/625 48/625 3/2500 24/625 9/1250 4/625 
p* 211/17000 609/3400 3717/34000 203/6800 81/17000 1827/34000 177/8500 203/34000 
zcyxw zcyxwc zcyxcw zcyxcwc zcycxw zcycxwc zcycxcw zcycxcwc 
p� 3/1250 48/625 27/1000 3/125 6/625 192/625 9/125 8/125 
p� 1/625 32/625 27/1250 12/625 27/2500 216/625 81/1250 36/625 
p* 59/17000 1239/17000 1593/34000 413/34000 81/4250 5 481/17000 177/2125 203/8500 
Table 1: Probability measures for Example 1. 
The Markov and the contraction conditions lead to 
d-separation properties for epistemic independence, 
when we require equivalence of credal sets for epistemic 
independence (Definition 1) . In this case, the con­
ditions allow a duplication of the d-separation proof 
for Bayesian networks [13]. The contraction condi­
tion is necessary because epistemic independence does 
not satisfy precisely the graphoid property of contrac­
tion employed in Verma, Geiger and Pearl's proof of 
d-separation [9]. 
Note that the contraction condition is not satisfied 
in Example 1. Note also that if we require equali ty 
between credal sets for epistemic independence, other 
graphoid properties may fail and the contraction con­
dition may not suffice for d-separation. 
The contraction condition may itself look too con­
voluted and a bit excessive, for the contraction and 
Markov conditions guarantee d-separation for al l ex­
tensions of a network. Instead, we may ask for the sep­
aration properties of particular extensions. Take the 
largest credal set that complies with (1) the constraints 
that define the local credal sets in a credal network; 
and with (2) the Markov condition for epistemic inde­
pendence. Call this credal set the independen t natural 
extension of the credal network. In general, a natural 
extension is simply the largest credal set satisfying a 
collection of constraints [23]. 
Independent natural extensions are quite intuitive, but 
little is known about them - except that the Markov 
condition generates far too many constraints. The in­
dependent natural extension of the network in Fig­
ure 1 has more than 6 million extreme points! Whether 
or not d-separation implies epistemic independence in 
independent natural extensions is an important open 
question with no obvious answer. Finding a counterex­
ample for d-separation relations, if there is one, is quite 
an undertaking, as even simple networks produce quite 
complex independent natural extensions. 
On top of the complexity issues, independent natural 
extensions do not satisfy a property that we might call 
be lief separation, as illustrated in the next example. 
Example 2 Consider two binary variables X and Y, 
such that (X EIN Y) and p(X) E [2/5, 1/2], p(Y) E 
[2/5, 1/2] (23, Sect. 9. 3. 4]. This can be represented by 
a trivial credal network with two unconnected nodes. 
The strong extension of this network has four extreme 
points (vectors [p(x,y) ,p(x,yc) ,p(xc,y) ,p(xc,yc)]): 
(1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4], (4/25, 6/25, 6/25, 9/25 ], 
[1/5, 1/5, 3/10, 3/10], (1/5, 3/10, 1/5 , 3/10]. 
The independent natural extension has six extreme 
points: the four points of the strong extension and 
[2/9, 2/9, 2/9, 1/3}, [2/11, 3/11, 3/11,3/11}. An expert 
then communicates that p(y) is exactly 2/5 . To sim­
plify our calculations, we simply go through the six 
densities in the independent natural extension, chang­
ing p(y) to 2/5. As X and Y are independent, we 
reason that there is no need to change the conditional 
densities p(XIY) and recompute the independent nat­
ural extension from scratch. Doing so, we obtain four 
different extreme points: 
[4/25, 6/25, 6/25, 9/25], [1/5, 3/10, 1/5 , 3/10], 
[1/5, 6/25, 1/5, 9/25 }, [4/25, 3/10, 6/25, 3/10}. 
The problem is that X and Y are not epistemically 
independent in this new extension; for example, p(y) = 
2/5 but p(yix) E (2/5, 4/7]. o 
A similar situation can be informally described as fol­
lows. Take three variables, X as {rain, no rain} , 
Y as {airport on, airport of}, W as {good, bad} 
for the weather at the remote location. Suppose we 
have the structure of Figure 1, including the relation 
(Y EIN W I X). The independent natural extension of 
this network introduces a form of "linkage" between 
the variables, because conditional densities for X and 
Y may be tied to particular marginal densities for W. 
If we find that an extreme point (with linkage) is inad­
equate, we cannot change p(W) or p(XIW) or p(YIX) 
for that extreme point in isolation. Independent ma­
nipulation of credal sets is not possible with epistemic 
independence and the standard Markov condition. 
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6 The strong Markov condition 
The previous sections made a detailed analysis of 
independence concepts and methods of extension in 
credal networks, and the result is far from satisfac­
tory. Strong extensions are quite manageable com­
putationally and satisfy d-separation, but there is no 
justification for strong extension as long as strong inde­
pendence remains only a mathematical generalization 
of standard stochastic independence. Epistemic inde­
pendence has a much better justification, but does not 
guarantee desirable separation properties. 
The key idea here is to recognize that the standard 
Markov condition, and not epistemic independence, is 
too weak. In essence, the standard Markov condition 
demands that beliefs about a situation should not be 
affected by the past once we know everything that 
causes that situation. But in fact we can say more: 
our beliefs about a situation should not be affected by 
the past, and by changes in our beliefs about the past, 
once we know everything that causes that situation. 
To obtain an improvement on the standard Markov 
condition, consider the following interpretation for the 
expression "changes in our beliefs." Suppose a joint 
credal set K(X, Y) is given. Every extreme point 
of K(X, Y) can be written as p(XIY) p(Y). Select 
an extreme point p(X, Y) , remove it from the collec­
tion of extreme points of the credal set and modify 
p(X, Y) : replace p(Y) by an arbitrary p'(Y) . Then in­
sert p( X I Y) p' (Y) into the collection of extreme points 
and take the convex hull of all densities there. Call any 
such modification of K(X, Y) a belief change with re­
spect to Y. 
This rationale leads to the following condition: 
Definition 6 (Strong Markov condition) Every 
variable xi is epistemically independent of its non­
descendants non-parents given its parents, regardless 
of any sequence of belief changes with respect to the 
nondescendants of xi. 
Denote the nondescendants non-parents of Xi by 
nD(Xi)· Intuitively, the strong Markov condition 
requires that (Xi EIR nD(Xi) I pa(Xi)) regardless of 
K(pa(Xi), nD(Xi)). 
Despite the intuitive character of the strong Markov 
condition, it is not clear whether this condition is use­
ful or not - i.e., whether or not it can lead to in­
teresting separation properties and important compu­
tational simplifications. The main result of the pa­
per, expressed by the next theorem, is that the strong 
Markov condition implies the standard Markov con­
dition with strong independence (the proof is in Ap-
pendix A). The impact of this result is discussed in 
Section 7. 
Theorem 3 In a credal network with convex local 
credal sets, the strong Markov condition holds if and 
only if every variable Xi is strongly independent of its 
nondescendants non-parents given its parents. 
To illustrate the consequences of Theorem 3, consider 
a quite common model in statistics: an experiment is 
independently repeated several times. Here we must 
differentiate between the assumption that the exper­
iment is independently repeated and the assumption 
that the repeated experiments are in fact exchangeable 
- that is, the exact same probabilistic model should 
represent every repetition of the experiment. Here we 
assume only independence; Walley discusses at length 
the concept of exchangeability and its implications in 
the theory of credal sets [23, Chap. 9]. 
Example 3 Take a collection of variables Xj, j E 
{ 1, ... , n} , where every variable is independent of all 
others and all variables can be modeled by the same 
equivalent credal sets. Suppose the marginal convex 
credal set K(Xj) is given for all variables Xj. If we 
assume the strong Markov condition, then the nat­
ural extension of this credal network is the strong 
extension 181 flt=I PJ(Xj), for every combination of 
PJ(XJ) E extK(Xj). o 
7 Discussion 
The main contribution of this paper is the strong 
Markov condition. To understand the place of the 
strong Markov condition in the theory of credal net­
works, note that Theorems 1 and 3 demonstrate the 
equivalence of: 
1. Strong Markov condition (with epistemic inde­
pendence) plus natural extension. 
2. Standard Markov condition (with strong indepen­
dence) plus natural extension. 
3. Strong extension. 
So, epistemic independence does satisfy the "belief 
separation" property through the strong Markov con­
dition is adopted. Note also that, in strong exten­
sions, d-separation implies epistemic independence [7], 
so epistemic independence and natural extension do 
display the same d-separation relations displayed by 
strong extensions and standard Bayesian networks. 
This argument proves the "soundness" of d-separation 
(that every d-separation relation produces an indepen­
dence relation). The "completeness" of d-separation 
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(there is always a joint credal set where variables that 
are not d-separated are dependent) comes from the 
fact that every standard Bayesian network is a credal 
network. 
Consequently, epistemic independence and natural ex­
tension do display the essential separation properties 
of standard Bayesian networks, provided we accept the 
strong Markov condition. Using the strong Markov 
condition, we obtain the computational simplicity as­
sociated with the strong extension. As a by-product, 
we obtain a clear justification for strong independence; 
namely, that strong independence is a consequence of 
epistemic independence and the strong Markov condi­
tion. 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the definition of strong 
independence has two drawbacks: it deals with indi­
vidual probabilities in a credal set, and, rather un­
fortunately, it requires an understanding of stochastic 
independence. The strong Markov condition solves the 
latter, more serious, problem as it does not require any 
concept of independence for individual probabilities. 
The strong Markov condition still relies on individual 
probabilities. But note that individual probabilities 
appear in a progression that is quite satisfactory in the 
theory of credal networks described here. The theory 
first adopts epistemic independence, then deals with 
multivariate and graphical representations, and only 
then introduces individual probabilities to define be­
lief changes. Future work should attempt to improve 
the results here by defining belief changes in terms of 
credal sets. 
In short, if we accept epistemic independence as the 
definition of independence and natural extension as the 
method of extension, we have a pleasant relationship: 
Strong Markov condition¢:> Strong extension. (4) 
Note that Expression ( 4) closely resembles the theory 
of Bayesian networks, where 
standard Markov condition<=? Expression (2). 
So we can build a powerful theory of credal networks 
starting from five elements: directed acyclic graphs 
and local credal sets, epistemic independence, the 
strong Markov condition and natural extension. Ul­
timately, Expression (4) is the reason why the strong 
Markov condition can be the foundation of a solid and 
appealing theory of credal networks. 
A Proofs 
Theorem 1: The strong extension must be equal 
or larger than l8l fLp(X;jpa(X;)), because this credal 
set satisfies the standard Markov condition for strong 
independence. But this set is the largest possi-
ble extension, because any larger set will have some 
p(X;jpa(X;), nD(X;)) as a non-constant function of 
nD(X;) - violating a strong independence relation 
required by the standard Markov condition. <> 
Theorem 2: Suppose X and Y are d-separated by 
Z; then every extreme point of the strong extension 
satisfies stochastic independence of X and Y given Z 
and consequently X and Y are strongly independent 
given z. <> 
Theorem 3: � If for every variable X;, X; and 
nD(X;) are strongly independent given pa(X;), then 
the strong Markov condition is satisfied. To see that, 
note that as any extreme point of an extension must 
satisfy p(X;Ipa(X;), nD(X;)) = p(X;Ipa(X;)), any ex­
treme point must satisfy (X; SIN nD(X;) I pa(X;)) re­
gardless of K(nD(X;)). 
=> Suppose the strong Markov condition holds for a 
given extension K(X). Denote D; = nD(X;) and 
A; = pa(X;). Take a particular variable X;, and se­
lect K'(A;, D;) to be a singleton set containing an ar­
bitrary everywhere positive density p'(A;, D;). This 
can be done arbitrarily because the strong Markov 
condition is valid for any sequence of belief changes, 
and a sequence can always be built to produce an ar­
bitrary p'(A;, D;). Note that K'(D;Ia;) is a single­
ton set for any value of A;, with density p'(D;Ia;). 
Consider the extreme points of K(X;, A;, D;) (the 
marginal credal set of extension K(X)) and work 
by reductio. Suppose that for one of the extreme 
points of K(X;, A;, D;), denoted by p*(X;, A;, D;), 
the density p* (X; Ia;, d;) is a non-constant function 
of D; for some value of A;. If this is true, there 
must be some value (x;, a;, d;) of (X;, A;, D;) such that 
p* (x;ja;, d;) < p* (x;la;). Now consider the unique ex­
tension of p'(A;ID;) and K(X;Ia;, d;) (the conditional 
credal set of extension K(X)); this unique extension 
is equal to p'(A;ID;) x K(X;IA;, D;), where x indi­
cates elementwise scalar multiplication. Note that the 
density p'(A;, D;)p*(X;IA;, D;) must belong to this 
unique extension. For some value (x;, a;, d;): 
=> p' (d;la;) p* (x; Ia;, d;)jp* (x;la;) < p' (d;la;), 
=> p* (d;lx;, a;) < p'(d;la;). 
Then p(d;lx;,a;) < p(a;ld;), contradicting the 
strong Markov conditioll. So every extreme point 
of K(X;, A;, D;) must have its conditional density 
p(X;jA;, D;) as a constant function of D;, and con­
sequently every variable X; is strongly independent of 
D; given A;. <> 
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